A Flawed Blueprint: How the Arab Plan for Gaza Ignores Hamas and the Two-State Deadlock

Last week, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation adopted the Arab League’s plan for the reconstruction of Gaza. The plan is largely a counter-proposal to U.S. President Donald Trump's initiative, which envisioned America ‘taking over’ the Gaza Strip and transforming it into a modern metropolis. It seems that Trump's plan has at least forced the Arab world into offering a plan of their own.

The Arab-backed plan outlines a six-month transitional period in which the Gaza Administration Committee, composed of technocrats, will manage affairs in the Strip before facilitating the full return of the Palestinian National Authority (PA). The PA has not held power in Gaza since Hamas seized control in 2007. While the plan briefly references the issue of “multiple armed Palestinian factions,” it offers no concrete solutions. This omission is especially striking given the plan’s assertion that an independent Palestinian state should exist “side by side in peace with Israel,” yet it fails to address Hamas, which has openly vowed to attack Israel again.

The plan insists that the only path forward is to provide a "clear political prospect," which it defines as the implementation of a two-state solution. It even goes so far as to claim that achieving this will “mark the end of all related Palestinian resistance activities.” However, its vague references to the two-state solution fail to offer any meaningful proposals for a final-status agreement beyond the generic assertion that “the two sides need to work it out.” What the plan fails to acknowledge is that a two-state solution is becoming increasingly unachievable—if it has not already become so.

Relying on two-state negotiations is a fundamental flaw of the plan, as it disregards the realities on the ground. The most recent polls, conducted in September last year, indicate that approximately 84% of Palestinians want Mahmoud Abbas to resign. Furthermore, 48% of Palestinians favour armed struggle as the preferred method for achieving an independent state, compared to just 30% who support negotiations. Notably, in Gaza, support for negotiations is slightly higher than support for armed struggle. The Arab plan speaks romantically of the Palestinians' right to self-determination and dignity, yet it promotes the return of the PA—an institution that Palestinians overwhelmingly distrust—under the leadership of a president they overwhelmingly want to step down.

Looking back at the Camp David process in 2000–2001, Israelis and Palestinians failed to reach an agreement despite the fact that the obstacles to peace were arguably smaller than they are today. The historic parameters proposed by President Clinton would have established a Palestinian state encompassing all of Gaza, 97% of the West Bank, sovereignty over Arab neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem, control over the Temple Mount, and tens of billions of dollars in refugee compensation. Yet, the Palestinian leadership presented multiple reservations that extended beyond the framework of the agreement, effectively rejecting it. Their negotiating stance remains rooted in principles such as UN Resolution 242 and the concept of ‘land for peace,’ arguing that they have already made their historic compromise by accepting this framework. However, Israel fundamentally disagrees that any agreement should be based on these principles.

The realities on the ground—though an obstacle to negotiations in 2000—have only grown more challenging since then, further complicating the Palestinian negotiating position. Since that time, Hamas has risen to power, ousted the PA from Gaza, and in 2023 launched an unprecedented attack on Israel, killing the most Jews in a single day since the Holocaust. Meanwhile, Israeli settlements in the West Bank have expanded by hundreds of thousands, making border negotiations and the viability of a contiguous Palestinian state increasingly difficult, while further fuelling Palestinian disillusionment.

Whether a two-state solution remains viable is a separate debate. What is clear, however, is that neither Israelis nor Palestinians are currently interested in final-status negotiations. Palestinians remain deeply disillusioned and, according to polling, increasingly favour armed resistance over negotiations. Conversely, Israel is unwilling to reward terrorism with statehood, and under the current religious-right government, settlement expansion is being encouraged rather than curtailed. The fundamental issue remains: Israel will not agree to any proposal that fails to address Hamas.

Haviv Rettig Gur, senior analyst for The Times of Israel, dismisses the plan as a farce, arguing that it is not meant to be taken seriously but rather serve as a symbolic counter-proposal to the U.S. plan, allowing Arab states to appear engaged. He asserts that as long as Hamas remains in power, Gaza cannot be rebuilt, as the group would divert concrete and funds to facilitate future attacks on Israel. Additionally, he warns that Hamas retains an armed force strong enough to challenge any Arab peacekeeping troops deployed to the Strip.

Strikingly, European nations have endorsed the Arab-backed plan despite its shortcomings. France, Germany, Italy, and Britain—who have previously stated that Hamas must have no role in Gaza’s future—have all expressed support for the proposal. Yet, in doing so, they have accepted a plan that does not seriously address the Hamas issue.

Is a two-state solution still possible? I am no longer certain. What is certain, however, is that radical change is needed. Palestinian incitement and terrorism must end, just as the expansion of settlements and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank must cease. The first step in what will inevitably be a long and arduous process is the disarming and removal of Hamas.